Transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re by Marie, Duží & Jespersen, Bjørn
“02duzi&jespersen”
2012/12/9
page 513
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
Logique & Analyse 220 (2012), 513–554
TRANSPARENT QUANTIFICATION INTO
HYPERPROPOSITIONAL CONTEXTS DE RE
MARIE DUŽÍ AND BJØRN JESPERSEN
Abstract
This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which
provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop-
ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening
Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be-
lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two
logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional
contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible-
world propositional contexts.) One rule validates this inference:
Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore,
there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The
other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it
is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such
that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the
de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub-
stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony-
mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity
of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten-
sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten-
sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as
co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is
Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the
typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on
a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and
application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper-
intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions
and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy-
perintensions.
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0. Introduction
Quine (1956) and Kaplan (1968), (1986) introduced the topic of quantifying-
in — existential quantification into modal and attitudinal contexts — into
the repertoire of philosophical logic and continue to shape the discussion
of it today. Quine and Kaplan, as well as their commentators, such as
Forbes (1996), (2000) and Crawford (2008), remain baffled by quantifying-
in for both logical, ontological and hermeneutic reasons.i This paper demon-
strates, in full logical detail, how to quantify into attitude contexts of the
toughest kind, namely hyperintensional ones. Following Cresswell (1975),
hyperintensional attitude contexts are those in which the complements of an
agent’s attitude are more finely individuated than up to necessary equiva-
lence. Quantifying into intensional attitude contexts — in which the com-
plements are individuated up to necessary equivalence, as in possible-world
semantics — falls out as a by-product of our solution to the hyperintensional
variant.
The cornerstone of our approach is that we avail ourselves of an extensional
logic of hyperintensions. Only an extensional logic will validate the rule
of existential generalization, hence only an extensional logic of hyperinten-
sions will stand a chance of validating quantifying-in. We assign to terms
and expressions occurring in hyperintensional contexts the very same se-
mantics that we assign to those very same terms and expressions when oc-
curring in intensional and extensional contexts. As a result of this top-down
approach, the logical rule of existential generalization applies indiscrimi-
nately to all contexts. The upside of our top-down approach is that referen-
tial transparency and compositionality of meaning are preserved throughout,
together with semantic innocence, since we have no recourse to reference
shift.ii At no point do we invoke contextualist epicycles to somehow create
i Quine’s stance towards quantifying into modal and attitudinal contexts is a convoluted
one, though. Both Kaplan (1986), Crawford (2008), and Forbes (1996), (2000) point out
that whereas Quine is dismissive of quantifying into modal, especially modal de re, con-
texts (which would yield ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ sentences of the form, “There is an x
such that x is necessarily an F ”), he strives to make good sense of what he calls relational
(roughly, de re) attitude ascriptions like, “There is a sloop that I want”, which presuppose
the validity of quantifying into attitude contexts. That is, whereas Quine rejects the argu-
ment Fa ∴ ∃xFx, he embraces the argument δGb ∴ ∃yδGy. See Crawford (2008)
and Forbes (1996), (2000) for detailed discussion of Quine’s excursions into dyadic versus
triadic belief relations, the latter being an attempt of his to recuperate transparency for re-
lational beliefs. For streamlined accounts of Quine’s take on quantifying-in, see Hookway
(1988, Chs. 5–7) and Kemp (2006, Ch. 6).
ii See Duží et al. (2010, p. 12) where we contrast Davidson’s ‘paratactic’ conception of
semantic innocence with a ‘hypotactic’ one. See also Tichý (1975).
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a secondary semantics for ‘non-extensional’ contexts. The perceived down-
side would be that we revise the prevalent extensionalist semantic theory of
terms and expressions, in that we universalize Frege’s semantics earmarked
for Sinn-sensitive contexts to all contexts, including those that are merely
Bedeutung-sensitive. Be that as it may, it is a strength of our solution that
it is emphatically not tailor-made specifically for validating quantifying-in.
Instead it is just yet another application of a large-scale background theory.
So our solution to quantifying-in is principled and not ad hoc.
Laying out the required semantics requires a fair amount of footwork. Once
this is in place, however, all that remains is filling in the nitty-gritty details
of quantifying-in. The devil is in the detail, as ever, and quantifying into
hyperintensional contexts is far from being technically trivial. But it is fea-
sible. Showing one way of how to exactly go about this is the task of this
paper. Our solution marks an advance for philosophical logic in general and
hyperintensional logic in particular. Kaplan (1990, p. 14) lists quantifying-
in as one of the challenges facing the program of pure semantics. So does
Bealer (1982, p. 13), who lists quantifying-in as one of ten ‘classical puzzles’
any (hyper-) intensional logic worth its name must be capable of addressing
adequately. And the community-wide project of establishing a general hy-
perintensional logic gains in credibility from cracking a hard nut.iii
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 details the three
aspects of quantifying-in: the logical, the ontological, and the hermeneutic
one. This paper is devoted to the first aspect. Section 2 presents the relevant
theoretical foundations of our extensional logic of hyperintensions. Section
3 sets out our theory of hyperpropositional and intensional attitudes de dicto
and de re. Section 4 provides the respective rules of quantifying into hyper-
propositional and possible-world propositional attitude contexts de re.
1. The Three Aspects of Quantifying-in
Quantifying-in spans three issues. The first is the logical one whether it is
formally possible to quantify into so-called non-extensional contexts. This
is, narrowly speaking, a question of the technical resources of a logical sym-
bolism. The second is the philosophical one whether it is ontologically ac-
ceptable to quantify over non-extensional entities. This is, in essence, a
question of the ontological commitments of a given logical theory. The third
is the likewise philosophical, or hermeneutic, question of to what extent it
iii See Bealer (1982, §7 and §11).
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makes sense to say, for instance, that there is somebody that somebody be-
lieves to be happy; that there is somebody such that they are believed by
somebody to be happy; or that there is somebody of whom somebody be-
lieves that they are happy. This question concerns the link between phi-
losophy and logic: if some logical symbolism enables quantifying-in then
what philosophical notion has been symbolized? Or conversely, exactly what
philosophical notion are we supposed to adequately interpret logically?
Let δ be a generic attitude operator.iv Then the first question broached above
translates into whether these two argument schemata (in the notation of pred-
icate logic) are valid:
δFa
∃xδFx
where the individual a is being quantified away, and
δFa
∃fδfa
where the property F is being quantified away.
Both schemata are valid without qualification — provided the principle of
existential generalization is untrammelled by considerations of which sort
of position in which sort of context one is attempting to quantify into. But
riding roughshod over contextual embedding is no option, of course. The
logical problem is that δ generates a context that seals f and x off from ∃,
which needs to reach across δ to catch f and x. (Definition 4 in Section
2 defines hyperintensional, intensional and extensional context by defining
what it means for a hyperintension to occur either mentioned or used.) This
is one reason why it would be naïve to assume that if, e.g., b believes that a
is an F then it logically follows that there is somebody that b believes to be
an F , or that there is a property that b believes a to have. Another reason is
that the truth of an ascription of a non-factive attitude such as believing need
not discharge existential presuppositions, as does knowing.v
iv For ease of exposition, we shall contrast existential quantifiers with attitude operators
in our informal discussion. However, formally speaking, TIL does not have attitude opera-
tors. Instead TIL has binary relations-in-intension between agents and either propositions or
hyperpropositions (propositional constructions). These relations are partial functions, such
that it is either true or false or neither, at some world/time pair of evaluation, that the relevant
agent entertains the relevant attitude to the relevant (hyper-)proposition.
v To know that Pegasus is a horse is not to know something factual. It is to know some-
thing conceptual. To understand the concept of Pegasus is to know, inter alia, that Pegasus is
a horse. Such knowledge does not presuppose the existence of an individual that is the horse
Pegasus. It does presuppose the existence of a set of properties jointly defining the individual
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It may be true that the attributee b believes that a is an F while it is at the
same time false that a exists.vi But, if b knows that a is an F then it needs
to be true already that a exists. The set of worlds at which Fa is known is
a (proper) subset of the set of worlds at which Fa is true. The set of worlds
at which Fa is believed is the union of the set of worlds at which Fa is
true and the set of worlds at which Fa is not true (because either false or
without truth-value). This is how room is created for believing falsehoods,
whether contingent or necessary (as with inconsistent beliefs), and believing
propositions without truth-value.vii
concept of Pegasus. The property of being a horse will be in that set, so will the property
of being winged. See Duží et al. (2010, pp. 286–88) on ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and (ibid., §4.1
‘Requisites defined’) on necessary relations-in-extension between intensions.
vi TIL pursues a Fregean tack in questions of attribution of existence: saying of an in-
dividual that it exists is trivially true. See Duží et al. (2010, §§2.3.1–2.3.2 ‘Existence and
extensions’, ‘Existence and intensions’). In the main text we are pretending, for ease of
exposition, that it be conceivable for a not to exist.
vii There is an interesting direct parallelism between factive attitude operators and subsec-
tive modifiers and between non-factive attitude operators and modal modifiers. Both the rule
of factivity and the rule of subsection are, syntactically, elimination rules:
Known A ∴ A
and
[Modifier Property](x) ∴ Property (x)
For instance, since the modifier Skillful is subsective, it follows that a skillful musician is a
musician. Set-theoretically, any set of skillful logicians must be a subset of a set of logicians.
Modal modifiers are somewhat elusive, oscillating as they do between being subsective and
being privative. (See Jespersen and Primiero (2012) on the logic of modal modification.)
The disjunction of A and ¬A is a classical tautology and so is too weak to capture what is
characteristic of non-factive operators and modal modifiers (that they are hit-or-miss). But
the conjunction of two mutually exclusive possibilities (matching the limiting case of union
where the intersection is empty) sums up the little that can be inferred (other than various
instances of existential generalization):
Believed A ∴ Possibly, A ∧ possibly,¬A
and
[Modifier′ Property](x) ∴ Possibly,Property (x) ∧ possibly,¬Property(x)
For instance, if x is an alleged terrorist then x is a terrorist or x is not a terrorist: there is a
world/time pair at which x is a terrorist and there is another world/time pair at which x is not
a terrorist. Both non-factive attitude operators and modal modifiers leave it open which side
truth comes down on.
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The second, ontological, question is exemplified by the second schema.
Whereas it is uncontroversial to quantify over individuals, it is controver-
sial, in some quarters, to quantify over so-called intensional entities such
as properties, propositions, relations-in-intension, and individual concepts.
Besides, if we do not assume that a is an individual but an individual con-
cept or role or office, such that b believes that the incumbent of that office
is an F , then the first schema involves quantification over individual con-
cepts. We are not going to argue independently for the acceptability or in-
dispensability of non-extensional entities here. Instead we simply assume
them, introducing two kinds of non-extensional entities: possible-world in-
tensions and hyperintensions.viii Our notion of hyperintension will be de-
fined in Definition 2 in Section 2. For now, our hyperintensions serve in the
capacities as modes of presentation of other entities, linguistic senses, and
the complements of hyperintensional attitudes. In particular, hyperproposi-
tions are sentential senses and are modes of presentation of truth-conditions,
or possible-world propositions, or empirical states-of-affairs. Our logic con-
tains the resources to quantify over hyperintensions. This is thanks to our
ramified type hierarchy, in which our hyperintensions are organized, since
there is always going to be a hyperintension presenting another hyperinten-
sion located one step down. (Definition 3 in Section 2 defines ramified type
hierarchy.)
The basic idea informing the rule of existential generalization is simple
enough. The conclusion of the rule of existential generalization makes ex-
plicit an existential commitment incurred by the premise. If the individual
Mary is happy then there is an element in the domain of individuals that is
happy:
Fa
∃xFx
This much is uncontroversial. Now what if the pope — the incumbent of the
papal office — is happy? Then we would not hesitate to infer that there is an
viii A valid objection, however, is that possible-world intensions are intensions on the
cheap, because they are extensionally individuated:
∀fg(∀w(f(w) = g(w))→ f = g)
Co-intensionality amounts to nothing other than necessary co-extensionality, because f , g
are mappings. This explains why TIL ranks possible-world intensions as first-order objects
and types them in the simple type theory (provided they do not have domain or range in
hyperintensions, i.e. TIL constructions, in which case they are higher-order objects and
must be typed in the ramified type theory). Outside the idiom of possible-world semantics,
‘intensional’ tends to equate ‘hyperintensional’ (unless used in the condescending sense of
‘non-extensional’). Just one example: Hindley and Seldin (1986, p. 72).
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individual office whose occupant is happy. What if “as ølglas er halvfuldt”
means that a’s glass of beer is half-full, but not that a’s glass is half-empty?
Then we would not hesitate to infer that there is a hyperproposition pre-
senting an empirical state-of-affairs, such that that hyperproposition is the
meaning of that Danish sentence.
Quantifying over hyperintensions yields weaker propositions than does quan-
tifying over intensional or extensional entities, because if we infer that there
is a hyperintension we still have not inferred, and so do not yet know, whether
this hyperintension presents anything, be it an intension or an extension. Let
f be an individual office.ix Then if a believes that the occupant of f is an
F , it follows that there is a hyperintension presenting an intensional entity
belonging to the type of individual offices, such that a believes that the occu-
pant of some office is an F . This inference would be a trivial one to draw. A
more interesting inference to draw is that there is an individual office, such
that a believes that its occupant is an F . A still more interesting inference
to draw is that there is an individual, such that a believes that that individual
is an F . Yet this conclusion is not always forthcoming.x If Mary believes
that the King of Canada is happy, does it follow that there is an x such that
ix There is a substantial difference between proper names and definite descriptions. This
distinction is of crucial importance due to their vastly different logical behaviour. Indepen-
dently of any particular theory of proper names, it should be granted that a proper proper
name (as opposed to a definite description grammatically masquerading as a proper name)
is a rigid designator of a numerically particular individual. On the other hand, a definite de-
scription like, for instance, ‘the Mayor of Dunedin’, ‘the King of France’, ‘the pope’, ‘the
first man to run 100 m in less than 9 seconds’, ‘the Evening Star’, etc., offers an empirical
criterion that enables us, in principle, to establish which individual, if any, satisfies the cri-
terion in a particular state of affairs. We model such criteria as possible-world intensions,
which are functions that for each possible world and each time return at most one individual.
Proper names do not come with an empirical criterion for fixing their bearers: it is purely
a matter of linguistic fiat which name has which bearer (so proper names are no empirical
terms for us).
x The set of inferences we just considered amounts to what Klement (2002, p. 157)
calls ‘at least a minimally adequate treatment’ of quantifying-in. Klement’s discussion of
quantifying-in is faithful to the historical Frege, such that existential quantification will be
over either a ‘saturated’ Gegenstand or an ‘unsaturated’ Funktion. Our neo-Fregean set-
ting allows for quantification over extensional or intensional or hyperintensional objects.
Frege did not have the intermediate level (on the almost uncontroversial assumption that Sinn,
which Frege frequently, though not always, argued to be individuated in terms of cognitive
significance, is hyperintensional). We agree with Klement that Frege’s analysis of quantify-
ing into “Gottlob believes that the Morning Star/Vulcan is a planet” amounts to, “There is
some Sinn that, when saturated with the incomplete Sinn of “ξ is a planet”, yields a Gedanke
believed by Gottlob”, with no Bedeutung being invoked (i.e. without executing something
akin to Church’s ∆ mapping from a Sinn to its Bedeutung), so the fact that ‘The Morning
Star’ picks out a Bedeutung, and ‘Vulcan’ does not, is of no logical import. What matters
is that the Eigennamen (in Frege’s inclusive notion of proper name) ‘The Morning Star’ and
‘Vulcan’ both have a Sinn. (Ibid., pp. 156–57.)
“02duzi&jespersen”
2012/12/9
page 520
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
520 MARIE DUŽÍ AND BJØRN JESPERSEN
Mary believes that x is happy? Absent the additional premise that the King
of Canada exists, the suggested inference will be a fallacy in case x ranges
over individuals. However, if believing is replaced by a factive attitude like
knowing then Mary’s knowledge that the King is happy presupposes that
it be true that Canada has exactly one king. With Mary’s factive attitude
as a premise, existential generalization over individuals in the conclusion is
straightforward — from an ontological, though not logical, point of view;
for there remains the problem of how the quantifier is to bind an x inside the
scope of an attitude operator.
The third question concerns the hermeneutic comprehensibility of predicat-
ing of a random individual the property of being believed (in a hyperinten-
sional manner) by some attributee to be such-and-such. For instance, Kaplan
(1969, p. 221) pauses to reflect on the meaningfulness of the quantified de re
ascription, “Someone is such that Ralph believes that he is a spy” (cf. entry
(10), ibid., p. 210). The notion of having an attitude of X lends itself to basi-
cally two different construals. On one construal, an attitude de re requires an
exceptionally intimate epistemic relation between agent and X, perhaps in a
manner that circumvents, or is prior to, most or all propositional knowledge
about X, and may not be easy to come by. On the other construal, an attitude
de re is parasitic on other attitudes, ultimately with an attitude de dicto at the
origin, and much easier to come by.xi Ours is the second approach, which is
devoid of the enigma integral with the first one.
This paper is the twin of another paper setting out the logic of transparent
quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de dicto. These are the last
two so far in a string of papers beginning with Tichý (1986), which quantifies
into intensional contexts and over intensions; Materna (1997), which quan-
tifies into hyperintensional contexts and over hyperintensions; Duží (2000),
which corrects and simplifies Materna (1997), but has a flaw of its own;xii
Duží et al. (2010, §5.3 ‘Quantifying in’), which puts forward a technically
correct but philosophically strained solution that is replaced by a technically
more elegant and philosophically appealing solution in Duží and Jespersen
(submitted). In the twin paper we analyze, in particular, the following argu-
ment, for which we consider four analyses, two of which are valid, and one
of which is the final analysis:
a believes that the Evening Star is a planet
There is a hyperintension presenting an individual office
such that a believes that the occupant of that office is a planet
xi See Duží et al. (2010, p. 435) for discussion.
xii See Duží et al. (2010, p. 500, n. 106).
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We also show how to validate the following inference:
a believes that the Evening Star is a planet
There is an individual office such that a believes that
the occupant of that office is a planet
We leave out of consideration non-empirical ‘that’-clause attitudes, such as
“a knows that pi is a transcendental number”, and notional attitudes, such
as “a seeks the fountain of youth” and “a calculates the first one million
decimals of pi”. The logic of quantifying into possible-world propositional
attitudes falls directly out of our logic of hyperpropositional attitudes, since
the former attitudes are technically less demanding and are obtained by lift-
ing various restrictions. The current paper follows a similar pattern. We also
restrict ourselves to hyperpropositional empirical attitudes de re, but since
intensional attitudes de re are a by-product, as it were, thanks to the trickle-
down effect of how our theory is set up, we display, for illustration, how to
quantify into intensional attitudes de re.xiii
We will concentrate on quantifying into the singular-reference position of
δFa. Our main focus is on singular terms having the semantics of definite
descriptions, because they are logically more intricate, and so more interest-
ing, than singular terms with the semantics of proper names. We assume, in
keeping with prevalent theories, that the meaning of a proper name (whatever
the details of one’s favourite theory of the meaning of proper names) is such
that a proper name rigidly refers to one and the same individual whatever the
contextual embedding. Hence, the transfer from the attributee’s perspective
to the attributer’s, and vice versa, goes smoothly. On the other hand, the
meaning of a definite description may occur either de dicto or de re, and a
definite description does not refer rigidly to a particular individual. Rather it
denotes an empirical condition that may be satisfied by individuals.
Here we are assuming, rather than arguing, that ‘The Evening Star’ and
‘The Morning Star’ are not two different names for the same individual.
Instead ‘The Evening Star’ names one individual office and ‘The Morning
Star’ names another individual office. When we say that the Evening Star is
the Morning Star, we mean to say that these two offices are contingently co-
occupied by the same individual. That is, “The Evening Star is the Morning
Star” does not express the self-identity of an individual bearing two names,
xiii Also hyperintensional notional (‘hypernotional’) attitudes are amenable to being quan-
tified into. See Duží et al. (2010, §§5.2–5.3 ‘Notional attitudes’, ‘Quantifying in’).
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but the contingent convergence of two named offices in one anonymous indi-
vidual.xiv We say of ‘The Evening Star’ and ‘The Morning Star’ that they are
not synonymous and do not co-denote, or are not equivalent (because they
do not denote the same office), but co-refer (because their respective denota-
tions happen to be co-extensional). For another standard example, although
Quine’s ‘the man in the brown hat’ and ‘the man on the beach’ happen to
co-refer to Bernard J Ortcutt, because their offices happen to co-describe
him, they do not co-denote him. Rather they denote, in every context, two
distinct individual offices. There are worlds and times at which these two
offices are co-occupied, e.g. by Ortcutt, but this empirical fact has no bear-
ing on the semantic properties of these two definite descriptions.xv Their
semantic properties concern instead whether they are synonymous (hence
co-denoting) or merely co-denoting. Our strategy is to raise the bar some-
what for what qualifies as identity and equivalence of senses and synonymy
vs. co-denotation of words and apply substitution of identicals and equiv-
alents to those (fewer) pairs of words that do pass muster. The opposite,
and common, strategy is to maintain a lower bar, which, however, generates
referential opacity and inapplicability of substitution and quantification in
various modal and attitudinal contexts.xvi Definition 7 in Section 2 defines
synonymy, equivalence (co-denotation) and co-reference.
We shall analyze the sentence
“Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet”
and its ‘exported’ variant, which introduces anaphoric reference:
“The Evening Star is such that Mary believes of it that it is a planet”
The exported variant can also be transformed from active to passive voice,
from
“The Evening Star is believed by Mary to be a planet”
to
xiv For justification, see Duží et al. (2010, §3.3.1 ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus: co-occupation
of individual offices’).
xv For further details, see Duží et al. (2010, pp. 301–11).
xvi Duží et al. (2010, Ch. 1, esp. §1.2, §1.4.2.3, §1.5.2 ‘The top-down vs. bottom-up ap-
proach to logical semantics’, ‘The top-down approach to semantics revisited’, ‘Supposition
de dicto and de re vs. reference shift’) provides details on this project of universal trans-
parency.
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“The Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet”
The strongest conclusion is that there is an individual such that Mary believes
that that individual is a planet. This conclusion is forthcoming in two cases.
The first case is factive attitudes: you cannot know that the pope is a German
unless there is exactly one pope of whom it is true that he is a German. The
second case is attitudes de re, including belief : you cannot believe of the
pope that he is a Protestant unless there is exactly one pope of whom to
believe that he is a Protestant.
Two other conclusions, one weaker than the other, can be inferred as well.
The weaker of the two is that there is a hyperintension presenting an office
such that the attributee believes that its occupant is a planet. The stronger
of the two is that there is an office such that the attributee believes that its
occupant is a planet. While hyperintensional attitudes de dicto and de re
both validate these last two conclusions, the important difference is that at-
titudes de re validate, furthermore, the strongest conclusion that there is an
individual of whom an attitude is being entertained. In our logic, if there
is no individual of whom or which to have the relevant attitude de re, the
proposition that the attributee believes, or knows, of the F that he/she/it is
an G will be without truth-value (rather than false). Contrast this with the at-
tribution of a belief de dicto that the F is a G, which will have a truth-value.
When a partial function such as a possible-world proposition trades a world
for a gap, we say that the hyperintension being used to present the propo-
sition is improper. Definition 2 in Section 2 defines proper and improper
hyperintensions.
2. Theoretical Foundations
The background theory we have implicitly presupposed so far is Tichý’s
Transparent Intensional Logic. What makes TIL suitable for the job of quan-
tifying into hyperintensional contexts is that the theory construes the seman-
tic properties of the sense and denotation relations of terms and expressions
as remaining invariant across linguistic contexts and that its ramified type
theory enables quantification up to any order.xvii
xvii Indexicals being the only exception: while the sense of an indexical remains constant,
its denotation trivially varies in keeping with its contextual embedding. See Duží et al. (2010,
§3.4 ‘Pragmatically incomplete meanings’).
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Formally, TIL is an extensional logic of hyperintensions based on the partial,
typed λ-calculus enriched with a ramified type structure to accommodate hy-
perintensions. The syntax of TIL is the familiar one of the λ-calculus, with
the addition of a hyperintension called Trivialization (symbolized by a super-
scripted nought). The semantics is a procedural (as opposed to denotational)
one. Thus, functional application, in TIL, is not the result of applying a func-
tion to an argument, but instead the very procedure of applying function to
argument; and functional abstraction, in TIL, is not the result of forming a
function, but instead the very procedure of sorting two selections of entities
into functional arguments and values, respectively. Furthermore, variables
are not terms, but hyperintensions: ‘x’ denotes the atomic hyperproposition
x that presents the value that an assignment function has accorded to x (rel-
ative to a type assignment and a sequence of variable/value pairs). The TIL
concept of procedurally construed hyperintensions is construction. Thus,
hyperintensional attitudes translate into constructional attitudes and hyper-
intensional contexts into constructional contexts. Of the six different kinds
of constructions that their inductive definition enumerates, we shall need four
altogether in order to quantify into hyperpropositional contexts de re and a
fifth for the intensional ones.
The first three definitions below constitute the logical heart of TIL. The sub-
sequent five definitions build upon those. Taken together, they make up
the logical tools needed to pull off quantifying into hyperpropositional and
possible-world propositional contexts de dicto and de re. These two variants
of quantifying-in are importantly different, so we exhibit the former for illus-
tration (the fourth and final analysis alluded to in Section 1). The definitions
are as follows.
Definition 1: (types of order 1) Let B be a base, where a base is a collection
of pair-wise disjoint, non-empty sets. Then:
(i) Every member of B is an elementary type of order 1 over B.
(ii) Let α, β1, . . . , βm(m > 0) be types of order 1 over B. Then the
collection (α β1 . . . βm) of all m-ary partial mappings from β1 ×
. . .× βm into α is a functional type of order 1 over B.
(iii) Nothing is a type of order 1 over B unless it so follows from (i) and
(ii). 
Remark. For the purposes of natural-language analysis, we are currently
assuming the following base of ground types, each of which is part of the
ontological commitments of TIL:
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o: the set of truth-values {T,F};
ι: the set of individuals (a constant universe of discourse);
τ : the set of real numbers (doubling as temporal continuum);
ω: the set of logically possible worlds (the logical space).
Definition 2: (construction)
(i) The variable x is a construction that constructs an object O of the
respective type dependently on a valuation v: x v-constructs O.
(ii) Trivialization: Where X is an object whatsoever (an extension, an
intension or a construction), 0X is the construction Trivialization. It
constructs X without any change in X.
(iii) The Composition [X Y1 . . . Ym] is the following construction. If X
v-constructs a function f of type (αβ1 . . . βm), and Y1, . . . , Ym v-
construct entities B1, . . . , Bm of types β1, . . . , βm, respectively, then
the Composition [X Y1 . . . Ym] v-constructs the value (an entity, if
any, of type α) of f on the tuple argument 〈B1, . . . ,Bm〉. Otherwise
the Composition [X Y1 . . . Ym] does not v-construct anything and so
is v-improper.
(iv) The Closure [λx1 . . . xm Y ] is the following construction. Let x1, x2,
. . . , xm be pair-wise distinct variables v-constructing entities of types
β1, . . . , βm and Y a construction v-constructing an α-entity. Then
[λx1 . . . xm Y ] is the construction λ-Closure (or Closure). It v-
constructs the following function f of the type (αβ1 . . . βm). Let
v(B1/x1, . . . ,Bm/xm) be a valuation identical with v at least up
to assigning objects B1/β1, . . . ,Bm/βm to variables x1, . . . , xm. If
Y is v(B1/x1, . . . ,Bm/xm)-improper (see iii), then f is undefined
on 〈B1, . . . ,Bm〉. Otherwise the value of f on 〈B1, . . . ,Bm〉 is the
α-entity v(B1/x1, . . . ,Bm/xm)-constructed by Y .
(v) The Single Execution 1X is the construction that either v-constructs
the entity v-constructed by X or, if X v-constructs nothing, is v-
improper.
(vi) The Double Execution 2X is the following construction. Where X
is any entity, the Double Execution 2X is v-improper (yielding noth-
ing relative to v) if X is not itself a construction, or if X does not
v-construct a construction, or if X v-constructs a v-improper con-
struction. Otherwise, let X v-construct a construction Y and Y v-
construct an entity Z: then 2X v-constructs Z .
(vii) Nothing is a construction, unless it so follows from (i) through (vi).

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The definition of the ramified hierarchy of types decomposes into three parts.
Firstly, simple types of order 1, which were already defined by Definition 1.
Secondly, constructions of order n, and thirdly, types of order n+ 1.
Definition 3: (ramified hierarchy of types)
T1 (types of order 1). See Definition 1.
Cn (constructions of order n)
(i) Let x be a variable ranging over a type of order n. Then x is a
construction of order n over B.
(ii) Let X be a member of a type of order n. Then 0X, 1X, 2X are
constructions of order n over B.
(iii) Let X,X1, . . . ,Xm(m > 0) be constructions of order n over B.
Then [X X1 . . . Xm] is a construction of order n over B.
(iv) Let x1, . . . xm,X(m > 0) be constructions of order n over B. Then
[λx1 . . . xm X] is a construction of order n over B.
(v) Nothing is a construction of order n over B unless it so follows from
Cn (i)–(iv).
Tn+1 (types of order n+ 1). Let *n be the collection of all constructions of
order n over B. Then
(i) *n and every type of order n are types of order n+ 1.
(ii) If 0 < m and α, β1, . . . , bm are types of order n + 1 over B, then
(α β1 . . . βm) (see T1 ii)) is a type of order n+ 1 over B.
(iii) Nothing is a type of order n + 1 over B unless it so follows from (i)
and (ii). 
Empirical languages incorporate an element of contingency that non-empiri-
cal ones lack. Empirical expressions denote empirical conditions that may
or may not be satisfied at some empirical index of evaluation. Non-empirical
languages have no need for an additional category of expressions for empiri-
cal conditions. We model these empirical conditions as possible-world inten-
sions. Intensions are entities of type (βω): mappings from possible worlds
to an arbitrary type β. The type β is frequently the type of the chronology
of α-objects, i.e. a mapping of type (ατ). Thus α-intensions are frequently
functions of type ((ατ)ω), abbreviated as ‘ατω’. We shall typically say that
an index of evaluation is a world/time pair 〈w, t〉. Extensional entities are
entities of some type α where α 6= (βω) for any type β.
Examples of frequently used intensions are: propositions of type oτω , prop-
erties of individuals of type (oι)τω , binary relations-in-intension between
individuals of type (oιι)τω , individual offices of type ιτω. As for individ-
ual offices, they are simply partial functions which, relative to a world/time
pair 〈w, t〉, return at most one individual as value. The notion of office is
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broader than, say, social role, though social roles like the pope and the King
of France were the original sources of inspiration. Given a 〈w, t〉, there is a
function from individual offices to individuals. This function is neither a sur-
jection, nor an injection, but a properly partial function, for some offices will
go vacant. Given a 〈w, t〉, there is no function from individuals to individual
offices, for some individual may occupy more than one office. Conversely,
it is not given that each individual occupies at least one office. Importantly,
the logical traffic does not flow from attributees (individuals) to individual
offices, for not every attributee is guaranteed to occupy an office presenting
a particular attributee.
Individual offices may be denoted by definite descriptions, but may just as
well be denoted by proper names not reducible to definite descriptions. It
depends on the linguistic quirks of a particular natural language in which
manner a particular office is denoted. For instance, on our analysis of ‘Hes-
perus’, ‘Phosphorus’ these Latin/English names are better off naming two
distinct offices (rather than the same individual), whereas ‘Prague’ is ar-
guably a proper name for Prague, containing no descriptive material. (See
Duží et al. (2010, §3.2 ‘Proper names’.))
Our explicit intensionalization and temporalization enables us to encode
constructions of possible-world intensions, by means of terms for possible-
world variables and times, directly in the logical syntax.xviii Where w ranges
over ω and t over τ , the following logical form (to be explained below) es-
sentially characterizes the logical syntax of any empirical language:
λwλt [. . . w . . . .t . . .]
Logical objects like truth-functions and quantifiers are extensional: ∧ (con-
junction), ∨ (disjunction) and⊃ (implication) are of type (ooo), and ¬ (nega-
tion) of type (oo). Quantifiers ∀α, ∃α are type-theoretically polymorphous,
total functions of type (o(oα)), for an arbitrary type α, defined as follows.
The universal quantifier ∀α is a function that associates a class A of α-
elements with T if A contains all elements of the type α, otherwise with
F. The existential quantifier ∃α is a function that associates a class A of
α-elements with T if A is a non-empty class, otherwise with F. Below all
type indications will be provided outside the formulae in order not to clutter
the notation. Furthermore, ‘X/α’ means that an object X is (a member) of
type α. ‘X →v α’ means that the type of the object valuation-constructed
by X is α. We write ‘X → α’ if what is v-constructed does not depend on a
xviii See Duží et al. (2010, §2.4 ‘Explicit intensionalization and temporalization’) or Jes-
persen (2005).
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valuation v. Throughout, it holds that the variables w →v ω and t→v τ . If
C →v ατω then the frequently used Composition [[C w]t], which is the in-
tensional descent (a.k.a. extensionalization) of the α-intension v-constructed
by C , will be encoded as ‘Cwt’.
When assigning constructions to expressions as their context-invariant mean-
ings, we use a particular method of semantic analysis. The method con-
sists in three steps, which are (a) type-theoretical analysis, (b) synthesis, and
(c) type-theoretical checking. For illustration, here is the analysis of the sen-
tence
“Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet”
(a) The types of the objects that receive mention in the sentence are: Mary/ι;
Believe*/(oι*n)τω: a relation-in-intension of an individual (a doxastic agent)
to a propositional construction; Evening Star/ιτω: an individual office;
Planet/(oι)τω: a property of individuals. Hyperpropositional belief, Be-
lieve* (with asterisk) of type (oι*n)τω , contrasts with propositional belief,
Believe (without asterisk) of type (oιoτω)τω , which is how possible-world
semantics (perhaps skipping the temporal parameter) types propositional at-
titudes.xix
(b) We combine constructions of the objects ad (a) in order to construct
the proposition of type oτω denoted by the sentence. Here is how.
First, since a property of individuals is not a type-theoretically proper ob-
ject to predicate of an individual office, we must first extensionalize both
intensions: [[0Planet w] t] →v (oι), [[0Evening Star w] t] →v ι, or
‘
0Planetwt’ and ‘0Evening Starwt’ for short. Now the Composition
xix So the type-theoretic difference between propositional and hyperpropositional attitudes
is the difference between (oιoτω)τω and (oι∗n)τω. One major philosophical difference is
that the former are used to model implicit attitudes and the latter to model explicit atti-
tudes, which translates into the logical difference between those attitudes that are deductively
closed and those that are not. If a knows implicitly/propositionally that the Morning Star
is a planet then a knows implicitly/explicitly every proposition entailed by the proposition
that the Morning Star is a planet. Implicit knowledge notoriously leads to one form or other
of logical omniscience (arguably the problem plaguing epistemic logic). If a knows*, ex-
plicitly/hyperpropositionally, that the Morning Star is a planet then much less is entailed,
depending on what sort of logical intelligence in the shape of command of rules of inference
has been assigned to a. (See Duží et al. (2010, §5.1.5 ‘Epistemic closure and inferable knowl-
edge’) for the notion of inferable knowledge, which charts the amount of explicit knowledge
a would be able to harvest if a were to apply his entire logical intelligence maximally to his
existing stock of explicit knowledge.) In this paper our concern is not why hyperpropositional
attitudes de re would or could or should be attributed to an agent, but rather how to obtain a
particular conclusion from them.
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[0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt] v-constructs T or F according as the individual
that occupies the office of Evening Star at a given 〈w, t〉-pair of evaluation
belongs to the class of planets at the same 〈w, t〉-pair.xx To obtain the propo-
sition that the Evening Star is a planet we must abstract over the values of
the variables w, t:
λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]
This is the predication of the property of being a planet of the occupant of
the office of Evening Star.
Since an empirical hyperpropositional attitude is always a relation to a con-
struction constructing a possible-world proposition, we model Mary’s act of
believing as the Composition
[0Believe*wt 0Mary 0[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]]]
In other words, the nested Closure constructing the proposition that the Eve-
ning Star is a planet must be Trivialized, as per 0[λwλt[0Planetwt 0Evening
Starwt]]. This Composition constructs T or F, according as Mary believes* at
〈w, t〉 that the Evening Star is a planet. Yet what is denoted by the sentence
does not depend on contingent facts like Mary’s being related or not to a
particular hyperproposition. Thus we must again abstract over the values of
w, t in order to construct the proposition denoted by the sentence (cf. explicit
intensionalization and temporalization):
λwλt [0Believe*wt 0Mary 0[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]]]
(c) We check whether the particular constituents of the above Closure are
combined in compliance with the type-theoretical rules. To this end we
draw a type-theoretical tree. In the interest of economy, we omit the steps of
checking extensionalizations like [0Planet w]→v ((oι)τ) and [[0Planet w]t]
→v (oι). Thus we directly draw 0Planetwt →v (oι). Moreover, instead
of two steps of intensionalization, e.g. λt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt] →v
(oτ) and λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt] → ((oτ)ω), we will directly
draw λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt] → oτω. The type-theoretically an-
notated tree is depicted by Figure 1.
xx See Duží et al. (2010, §2.4.2 ‘Predication as functional application’) for details.
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λwλt[0Believe*wt 0Mary 0[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]]]
(oι) ι
o
oτω
(oι*1) ι *1
o
oτω
✥✥✥
✥✥✥
❍❍
❍
✡✡✟✟
✟✟
✧✧
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
PP
P
✏✏
✏✏
Figure 1. Type-theoretical tree
The above example illustrates also the difference between a sub-construction
simpliciter and a constituent sub-construction, i.e. between a sub-construc-
tion which is mentioned as a functional argument, thereby displaying it-
self, and a sub-construction which is used to construct an object different
from the sub-construction. The former case constitutes a hyperintensional
context, the latter an extensional/intensional context. In our example the
sub-construction that is mentioned within the whole analysis is the Closure
[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]]. This is so because this hyperpropo-
sition is the second argument of the function Believe*wt, the first argu-
ment being Mary. The hyperproposition is mentioned by the constituent
0[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]], and thus the mentioned Closure and
all its sub-constructions occur hyperintensionally.
Figure 2 illustrates using/mentioning entities at the three different levels.
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linguistic level: Expression E
✧
✧
✧
✧
✧✧
❜
❜
❜
❜
❜❜
mentioned used
to express its meaning:
constructional level: procedure (TIL construction CE)
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
❅
❅
❅
❅
CE-mentioned∗ CE-used∗
to produce an output,
(if any)
✦✦
✦✦
✦✦
✦✦
❩
❩
❩
❩
denotational
(functional) level: CE used ∗ intensionally CE used ∗ extensionally
(in particular de dicto) (in particular de re)
Figure 2. Using/mentioning entities
The three kinds of context are defined in Duží et al. (2010, §2.6). Here
we need only the definition of the distinction between using and mentioning
constructions:
Definition 4: (construction mentioned vs. used as a constituent) Let C be a
construction and D a sub-construction of C .
(i) If D is identical to C (i.e., 0C = 0D) then the occurrence of D is
used as a constituent of C .
(ii) If C is identical to [X1 X2 . . . Xm] and D is identical to one of the
constructions X1,X2, . . . ,Xm, then the occurrence of D is used as
a constituent of C .
(iii) If C is identical to [λx1 . . . xm X] and D is identical to X, then the
occurrence of D is used as a constituent of C .
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(iv) If C is identical to 1X and D is identical to X, then the occurrence
of D is used as a constituent of C .
(v) If C is identical to 2X and D is identical to X, or 0D occurs as a
constituent of X and this occurrence of D occurs as a constituent of
Y v-constructed by X, then the occurrence of D is used as a con-
stituent of C .
(vi) If an occurrence of D is used as a constituent of an occurrence of
C ′ and this occurrence of C ′ is used as a constituent of C , then the
occurrence of D is used as a constituent of C .
(vii) If an occurrence of a sub-construction D of C is not used as a con-
stituent of C then the occurrence of D is mentioned in C .
(viii) No occurrence of a sub-construction D of C is used/mentioned in C
unless it so follows from (i)–(vii). 
Remark. In theory, a construction may be mentioned by another kind of
construction than Trivialization; but in this paper we limit ourselves to Trivi-
alization. Thus the Trivialization 0[λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]] men-
tions the Closure [λwλt [0Planetwt 0Evening Starwt]] and all the constituents
of this Closure.xxi
Traditionally, the validity of quantifying-in has been fielded as a logical
criterion for distinguishing (i) extensional/ transparent/‘relational’ (Quine)
contexts from (ii) non-extensional/opaque/‘notional’ (Quine) contexts. The
idea is that extensional (etc.) contexts are those that validate quantifying-in.
And conversely, if a context resists quantifying-in, it is deemed to be in vi-
olation of one or more of the laws of extensional logic and as eluding full
logical analysis. What we are saying is that also intensional and hyperin-
tensional contexts may be quantified into, but that the feasibility of doing so
presupposes that it be done within an extensional logic of hyperintensional
contexts. Deploying a non-extensional logic of hyperintensions in order to
quantify into hyperintensional contexts would, indeed, be a non-starter, gen-
erating opacity and thereby making hyperintensional attitude contexts log-
ically intractable: it would be left logically lawless which terms (or mean-
ings, as we would have it) could be substituted for which ones inside an
attitude report. However, whether one accepts quantifying into (hyper-) in-
tensional contexts or wants to restrict quantification to extensional contexts,
like “Mary is happy”, the logical question still remains which sort of context
validates which sort of quantifying-in. Tichý issues in (1986, p. 256; 2004,
p. 654) a warning against inter-defining the notion of extensional context and
the validity of the rules of substitution of co-referring terms and existential
xxi The use/mention distinction normally applies only to words; in TIL it applies also to the
meanings of words (i.e., constructions). See Duží et al. (2010, §2.6 ‘Three kinds of context’).
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generalization on pain of circularity (where TIL and Quine agree on the use
of ‘co-referential’):
Q: When is a context extensional?
A: A context is extensional if it validates (i) the rule of substitution of
co-referential terms and (ii) the rule of existential generalization.
Q: And when are (i), (ii) valid?
A: Those two rules are valid when applied to extensional contexts.
We steer clear of the circle by defining extensionality for (i) hyperintensions
presenting functions, for (ii) functions (including possible-world intensions),
and for (iii) functional values. These three levels are squared off with three
kinds of context:
(i′) hyperintensional contexts, in which a hyperintension is not used to
present an object, but is itself mentioned as functional argument
(though a hyperintension of one order higher needs to be used to
mention this lower-order construction);
(ii′) intensional contexts, in which a hyperintension is used to present a
function without presenting a particular value of the function (more-
over, the hyperintension does not occur within another hyperinten-
sional context);
(iii′) extensional contexts, in which a hyperintension is used to produce a
particular value of the function at a given argument (moreover, the
hyperintension does not occur within another intensional or hyperin-
tensional context).
The leading idea is that transparency in hyperintensional contexts requires
identity of senses (hence pairs of synonymous words), while transparency
in intensional contexts requires only equivalence of senses (hence pairs of
co-denoting words).
If a construction C occurs mentioned in D, then all its sub-constructions
(including C) occur hyperintensionally in D. Moreover, all the variables
occurring within such a hyperintensional context are 0bound. Thus in TIL
we have two ways of binding variables: λ-binding (as in any λ-calculus) and
0binding (which is unique to TIL). The latter is dominant over the former,
because a higher-order context is dominant over a lower-order one. Thus we
define:
Definition 5: (free and bound variables) Let C be a construction with at
least one occurrence of a variable ζ .
(i) Let C be ζ . Then the occurrence of ζ in C is free.
“02duzi&jespersen”
2012/12/9
page 534
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
534 MARIE DUŽÍ AND BJØRN JESPERSEN
(ii) Let C be 0X. Then every occurrence of ζ in C is 0bound (‘Trivializa-
tion-bound’).
(iii) Let C be [λx1 . . . xn Y ]. Any occurrence of ζ in Y that is one of
xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is λ-bound in C unless it is 0bound in Y . Any oc-
currence of ζ in Y that is neither 0bound nor λ-bound in Y is free in
C .
(iv) Let C be [X X1 . . . Xn]. Any occurrence of ζ that is free, 0bound,
λ-bound in one of X,X1, . . . ,Xn is, respectively, free, 0bound, λ-
bound in C .
(v) Let C be 1X. Then any occurrence of ζ that is free, 0bound, λ-bound
in X is, respectively, free, 0bound, λ-bound in C .
(vi) Let C be 2X. Then any occurrence of ζ that is free, λ-bound in a
constituent of C is, respectively, free, λ-bound in C . If an occurrence
of ζ is 0bound in a constituent 0D of C and this occurrence of D is
a constituent of X ′ v-constructed by X, then if the occurrence of ζ
is free, λ-bound in D it is free, λ-bound in C . Otherwise, any other
occurrence of ζ in C is 0bound in C .
(vii) An occurrence of ζ is free, λ-bound, 0bound in C only due to (i)–(vi).
A construction with at least one occurrence of a free variable is an open con-
struction. A construction without any free variables is a closed construction.

The next notion we need to define is that of synonymy. Our notion of syn-
onymy is defined in virtue of procedural isomorphism. Only procedurally
isomorphic constructions, to the exclusion of merely equivalent ones, are
substitutable salva veritate in hyperintensional contexts. The term ‘pro-
cedural isomorphism’ is a nod to Carnap’s intensional isomorphism and
Church’s synonymous isomorphism. Church’s Alternatives (0) and (1) leave
room for additional Alternatives in between. One would be Alternative (1/2),
another Alternative (3/4). The former includes α- and η-conversion while
the latter adds a restricted form of β-conversion.xxii If we must choose,
we would prefer Alternative (3/4) to soak up those differences between β-
transformations that lack natural-language counterparts. The exact calibra-
tion of procedural isomorphism is less pressing here. What is important is
that we should have a formal theory of synonymy and that, since we decide
to include some form of β-conversion in the mix, we should have a means to
block instances of invalid β-conversion.
One reason for excluding unrestricted beta-conversion is the well-known
fact that β-conversion is not an equivalent transformation in logics boasting
xxii For Alternative (1/2), see Jespersen (2010).
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partial functions, such as TIL. Another reason is that occasionally even β-
equivalent constructions have different natural-language counterparts; wit-
ness the difference between attitude reports de dicto vs. de re. Thus, the
difference between “a believes that b is happy” and “b is believed by a to
be happy” is just the difference between β-equivalent meanings. The former
(de dicto) receives the possible-world analysis
λwλt [0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt b]]
while the latter (de re) receives the possible-world analysis
λwλt [λx[0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt x]]b]
Types: Happy/(oι)τω; x→v ι; a, b→ ι.
Note that attitudes de dicto and de re are in general not equivalent. The fol-
lowing two sentences denote different propositions:
“a believes that the pope is happy”;
“The pope is believed by a to be happy”
Their propositional analyses are (Pope/ιτω):
λwλt [0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt 0Popewt]];
λwλt [λx[0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt x]]0Popewt]
While the former Closure constructs a proposition that may well be true even
when there is no pope (the papal office going vacant), the proposition con-
structed by the latter Closure will have a truth-value gap at such a world/time
pair. This is because at such a world/time pair at which the office is vacant
the Composition 0Popewt is v-improper. Due to compositionality, the whole
Composition [λx[0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt x]]0Popewt] comes out v-
improper and so does not v-construct what it is typed to construct, namely a
truth-value.
The restricted version of equivalent β-conversion we have in mind consists
in substituting free variables for λ-bound variables of the same type, and will
be called βr-conversion. For instance, we see little reason to differentiate
semantically or logically between “b is believed by a to be happy” and “b
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has the property of being believed by a to be happy”.xxiii The latter sentence
expresses
λwλt [λw′λt′λx[0Believew′t′ a λwλt [0Happywt x]]wt b]
This is merely a βr-expanded form of
λwλt [λx[0Believewt a λwλt [0Happywt x]] b]
Thus we define:
Definition 6: (procedurally isomorphic constructions: (A3/4)) Let C , D be
constructions. Then C , D are α-equivalent iff they differ at most by de-
ploying different λ-bound variables. C , D are η-equivalent iff one arises
from the other by η-reduction or η-expansion. C , D are βr-equivalent iff
one arises from the other by βr-reduction or βr-expansion. C , D are pro-
cedurally isomorphic, denoted ‘0C ≈ 0D′,≈/(o*n*n), iff there are closed
constructions C1, . . . , Cm,m ≥ 1, such that 0C = 0C1, 0D = 0Cm, and all
Ci, Ci+1(1 ≤ i < m) are either α-, η- or βr-equivalent. 
Remark. The four constructions 0Prime, λx[0Prime x], λy[0Prime y], λz[λx
[0Prime x]z] are procedurally isomorphic, while λx[[0Card λy[0Divide y x]]
= 02] is only equivalent to them; it constructs the set of primes, to be sure,
but does so in a non-isomorphic manner. (Types: x, y, z → ν, the type of
natural numbers; Card/(ν(oν)): the number of elements of a final set of nat-
ural numbers; Divide/(oνν): the relation of x being divisible by y.)
Remark. Given a set of procedurally isomorphic constructions, we privilege
the element that is in normal form to serve as a representative of the set. That
element is the simplest one in the set and is defined as the alphabetically first,
non-η-reducible construction. Thus, of the four constructions mentioned in
xxiii This is not to say we see no reason at all not to differentiate. For instance, if the be-
liever is a self-assured nominalist then he may protest that while he does believe that a is
happy he does not believe that a has any properties. Or it could be argued that one thing is
to believe that a is happy and another is to believe that a has the property of being happy,
because the latter at least appears to presuppose that the believer have the additional concep-
tual resources to master the notion of property. Furthermore, Soames (2010, Ch. 2) takes
issue with Frege’s claim, in ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand’, that “das Prädikat ‘fallend unter
den Begriff Mensch’ [dasselbe bedeutet wie] ‘ein Mensch”’. This would namely mean that
“Jesus ist ein Mensch” and “Jesus fällt unter den Begriff Mensch” would express the same
Thought, i.e. be synonymous, i.e. share the same logical structure, which is hardly true of
these two sentences. Further research is required. See Duží et al. (2010) and also Duží and
Jespersen (2012) for discussion.
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the previous Remark, 0Prime is the one in normal form. See Duží et al.
(2010, §2.2.1 ‘Concepts and synonymy’, esp. p. 155). When in this paper we
speak of the construction of something we intend a construction in normal
form.
Since merely co-referential expressions can be substituted salva veritate only
in extensional contexts, merely co-denotational or equivalent expressions in
intensional and extensional contexts, and synonymous expressions in all con-
texts, we define:
Definition 7: (synonymous, equivalent and co-referential expressions) Ex-
pressions E1 and E2 are synonymous if their meanings are procedurally
isomorphic. Expressions E1 and E2 are equivalent (or co-denoting) if their
meanings v-construct one and the same object for every valuation v. Fi-
nally, empirical expressions E1 and E2 are co-referential if their meanings
construct intensions whose values are the same at the 〈w, t〉 of evaluation.

To summarize, the relevant tenets of TIL are these five:
1. (hyperintensional syntax) its syntax explicitly mentions hyperinten-
sions;
2. (anti-contextualism) a non-indexical term’s sense and denotation re-
main constant for all contexts;
3. (mention versus use) what is context-sensitive is whether a hyperin-
tension occurs mentioned or used in a given context: if mentioned, it
itself is operated on; if used, what it yields is operated on;
4. (ramified type hierarchy) the ramified type hierarchy enables higher-
order hyperintensions to present lower-order hyperintensions (which
in turn enables quantifying into hyperintensional contexts of any or-
der);
5. (mode of presentation) it displays in logical terms how n-order con-
structions construct n-1-order constructions and first-order objects,
by defining the various ways in which various constructions construct
objects of various types.
Our neo-Fregean semantic schema, which applies to all contexts, is this:
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Expression
expresses
denotes Construction
Denotation
❄✲
❄
Figure 3. Semantic schema
The most important relation in this schema is between an expression and its
meaning (a construction). We can investigate a priori what (if anything) a
construction constructs and what is entailed by it. Once a construction is ex-
plicitly given as a result of logical analysis, the entity (if any) it constructs is
already implicitly given, whereas it requires inquiry a posteriori to establish
the reference of an empirical term at a given world/time pair. As a limiting
case, the logical analysis may reveal that the construction fails to construct
anything because it is improper. And if the construction is not improper,
the denotation can be either a first-order object (i.e. a non-construction)
or a lower-order construction. Intensional constructions (constructions of
objects of type (βω)) are always proper, since they always construct an in-
tension (including degenerate ones, which return no value at all or always
the same value). In linguistic terms, every word whose sense is an inten-
sional construction has a denotation, but will lack a reference at some or all
〈w, t〉 pairs, in case its denotation (a partial function) fails to return a value.
This applies to, inter alia, ‘The pope’, ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening
Star’.
3. Hyperintensional and Intensional Attitudes de dicto and de re
We begin by explaining how we understand the distinction between attitudes
de dicto and de re. The philosophical difference between attitudes de dicto
and de re is pivoted on an inversion of perspective: an attribution de dicto
reproduces the attributee’s perspective; an attribution de re, the attributer’s.
Let F/ιτω be an office and G/(oι)τω a property. Consider then the sentence
“a believes that the F is a G”
Let a’s belief be an intensional attitude; Believe/(oιoτω)τω . The meaning
of the definite description ‘the F ’ occurs with supposition de dicto. The
reason is this: a is related to the whole proposition that the F is a G. Hence
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a’s attitude depends not only on the actual and current truth-value of this
proposition but on all its values. Consequently, a’s attitude concerns also
the entire office F and not only its actual and current value. Even if there
is no such value, a may well believe that the F is a G. The analysis of the
sentence is this Closure:
λwλt [0Believewt a [λw*λt*[0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]]]
Remark. *-superscripted letters for w, t variables represent the attributee’s
perspective, while those without superscript represent the attributer’s. In the
interest of full generality, throughout the rest of this paper we will use a→ ι
as an arbitrary construction of an individual agent. Derivatively, ‘a’ will be
an arbitrary name for an arbitrary individual.)
In case a’s belief is a hyperintensional attitude, Believe*/(oι*n)τω , then a
is related to a hyperproposition, i.e. a propositional construction, and the
sentence encodes this construction:
λwλt [0Believe*wt a 0[λw*λt*[0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]]]
As before, a’s attitude does not concern only the value of ‘the F ’ in the actual
world at the present moment. Now the hyperproposition [λw*λt*[0Gw*t*
0Fw*t*]] is itself the object of a’s belief. Regardless of whether there is a
value of the office F , the whole office has a role to play, as it is embedded
within the attributee’s perspective 〈w*, t*〉.
One worry, though, that one may have concerning attitudes de dicto, both
intensional and hyperintensional, is the following. Constructions (usually
Trivializations) of individual offices occur as part of the hyperpropositions
that either construct a possible-world proposition or are themselves con-
structed to figure as complements of attitudes. Does this demand of the
attributees that they possess a notion of individual office? The worry is that
this may be asking too much, as it would require attributees to have concep-
tual resources they may actually, and reasonably, lack. Our position is this.
If an attributee lacks any concept of intensions in their personal conceptual
repertoire then indeed no attribution of an intension-involving attitude is an
option. Such an attribution would fail to respect the attributee’s perspective,
whatever alternative perspective that might happen to be, as the attribution
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would ‘hyper-intellectualize’ the attributee’s actual attitude.xxiv To have in-
tensions in one’s personal conceptual repertoire means comprehending the
intensional character of some entity, e.g. the Evening Star. Its intensional
character amounts in essence to the fact that it is not the numerically same
individual that is the Evening Star in all possible empirical circumstances
(all pairs of worlds and times), whenever a celestial body happens to be the
Evening Star. But suppose the designated attributee uses ‘The Evening Star’
as a name for the individual Venus, because Venus is the actual Evening Star,
while the designated attributer uses ‘The Evening Star’ as a name for the in-
dividual office of Evening Star. Then the consequence, relative to our frame-
work, is that attributer and attributee speak at cross purposes, ‘The Evening
Star’ being an instance of homonymy. The designated attributer is, therefore,
not in a position to make a faithful attribution of an attitude de dicto to the
designated attributee. Our framework observes the constraint that attributer
and attributee must find themselves within the same conceptual system (see
Duží et al. (2010, §2.2.3 ‘Conceptual system’). This involves according
the same logical character to the Evening Star, be it as an individual or as
an individual office, hence according the same semantic character to ‘The
Evening Star’, as a name for an individual and a name for an individual
office, respectively.
The situation is completely different with attitudes de re. To explain the na-
ture of the attitude clearly, we use the passive form:
“The F is believed by a to be a G”
Now the attributer uses the office F as a pointer to a particular individual.
The attributer might just as well have used any other office also occupied
by that individual to single out the individual. For the proposition denoted
by the sentence to be true, there must be a specific individual to whom a is
related by believing that this individual has the property of being a G. This
does not, however, mean that a is aware of the fact that this individual occu-
pies the office F . There are namely two independent questions: “Who holds
the office F ” and “What does a think of that individual?” The attributer, not
the attributee, needs to make the connection between office and occupant.
Now for the analysis of hyperpropositional attitudes de re. As above, let
Believe*/(oι*n)τω be a relation-in-intension of an individual agent a to a
xxiv We are indebted to a referee for the apt phrase ‘hyper-intellectualize’ and for urging us
to clarify our stance on the topic under what circumstances attributees must possess a notion
of individual office.
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hyperproposition. Then the active variant of a hyperpropositional attitude de
re is this:
“a believes* of the F that it is a G”
The embedded clause “it is a G” contains the anaphoric reference ‘it’ to its
antecedent ‘the F ’.xxv The meaning of this clause is an open construction
with a free variable it →v ι: λwλt [0Gwt it]. Recall that our assignment
of constructions to expressions as their meaning is context-invariant. Hence
the meaning of this clause is the same in all contexts, whether extensional,
intensional or hyperintensional.
Its meaning is any construction procedurally isomorphic with λwλt [0Gwt it],
e.g. λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]. The latter is an α-equivalent variant of the former
with superscripted variables w*, t*, in order to represent the attributee’s per-
spective. The attributer wants to express the fact that the individual who is
the value of it is the holder of F . If F goes vacant, then there is no such
holder and the proposition denoted by the sentence has a truth-value gap.
On the other hand, if there is a holder of F , we must pre-process the Closure
λwλt [0Gwt it] in such a way that we substitute a construction of the holder
of F (if any) for the variable it in the Closure. To this end we apply a sub-
stitution technique using the function Sub. Sub is of the polymorphous type
(*n*n*n*n) and operates on constructions in the following way. Let X, Y ,
Z be constructions of order n. Then Sub is a mapping which, when applied
to 〈X,Y,Z〉, returns the construction that is the result of correctly substi-
tuting X for Y in Z . A correct substitution is one that does not make any
variable occurring free in X bound in the resulting construction (no ‘colli-
sion’). For illustration, the Composition [0Sub 001 0x 0[0> x 00]] constructs
the result of substituting 01 for x into [0> x 00], which is the Composi-
tion [0> 01 00]. Therefore, the Composition [0Sub 001 0x 0[0> x 00]] is
equivalent to 0[0> 01 00], both constructing the Composition [0> 01 00] that
constructs T.
Another polymorphous function we need when applying this substitution
method is Tr/(*n α) defined as follows.xxvi Let α be a type of order n, o an
object of type α. Then Tr is a function which, when applied to o, returns the
Trivialization of o. There is an essential difference between the construction
Trivialization and the function Tr. For instance, whereas the Trivialization
xxv For our method of the analysis of sentences with anaphoric references, see Duží et al.
(2010, §5.3 ‘Quantifying in’).
xxvi Tichý introduces Sub in (1988, p. 75) and Tr in (ibid., p. 68), where Tr is typed to take
natural numbers to their respective Trivialization. Tr is easily generalized as a polymorphous
function, however.
“02duzi&jespersen”
2012/12/9
page 542
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
542 MARIE DUŽÍ AND BJØRN JESPERSEN
03 constructs the number 3, the Composition [0Tr 03] constructs the Trivial-
ization 03. Whereas the Trivialization 0x 0binds the variable x and constructs
just x, the variable x is free in the Composition [0Tr x], which v-constructs
the Trivialization of the number that v assigns to x. Thus, [0Tr x] v(2/x)-
constructs the construction 02. To illustrate the application of Sub and
Tr, consider the schematic Composition [0Sub [0Tr 0Awt] 0y 0[. . . y . . .]],
where A/ιτω; y →v ι; b/ι. This Composition either v-constructs the Com-
position [. . . 0b . . .], in case 0Awt v-constructs b, or is v-improper, in case
0Awt is v-improper, the individual role A going vacant at 〈w, t〉. In or-
der to obtain the product of the substitution result, if any, we must exe-
cute the resulting Composition. To this end we apply Double Execution:
2[0Sub [0Tr 0Awt]
0y 0[. . . y . . .]].
In our case we need to substitute the Trivialization of the individual v-
constructed by 0Fwt for the variable it into the Closure λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it].
Thus we get
[0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt]
0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]
If 0Fwt is v-improper (i.e., F is vacant at 〈w, t〉), then due to composition-
ality (cf. Definition 2. iii), the whole Composition is v-improper. Let 0Fwt
v-construct the individual b. Then the result of the substitution is the Clo-
sure [λw*λt* [0Gw*t*
0b]]. Since we analyze hyperpropositional attitude,
the agent a is related to this very Closure. Hence the analysis of “a believes*
of the F that it is a G” is this Closure:
λwλt [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
The truth-value of this proposition at a given 〈w, t〉-pair of evaluation de-
pends on the holder of the office at 〈w, t〉; it is irrelevant who occupies it
at worlds/times other than 〈w, t〉. We say that the meaning of ‘the F ’, i.e.
0F , occurs with de re supposition here. In this case the two de re princi-
ples are valid. They are (i) the principle of existential presupposition and
(ii) the principle of substitution of co-referential expressions. It is not only
entailed but also presupposed that the F exists, which means that the office
F is occupied at a given 〈w, t〉. For, if the office goes vacant then for the
same reason also the negated sentence “a does not believe* of the F that it
is a G” denotes a proposition with a truth-value gap. Hence, in order that the
denoted proposition have any truth-value, the office F must be occupied.
As for the substitution principle, if the office succeeds in picking out an
individual b, then we can validly infer that b is believed* by a to be a G.
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And if this individual happens to occupy another office H/ιτω , then we can
validly infer that the H is believed* to be a G. We have got the following
valid argument, based on the principle of predication de re, which is derived
from the principle of substitution of co-referential terms:
λwλt [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
λwλt [0Fwt =
0Hwt]
λwλt [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Hwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
The rationale informing the principle of predication de re is that if two offices
are co-occupied at 〈w, t〉 then what, at 〈w, t〉, is predicated of the occupant
of one office is eo ipso what is predicated, at 〈w, t〉, of the occupant of the
other office.xxvii
The passive variant of the hyperpropositional attitude de re is phrased in this
manner:
“The F is believed* by a to be a G”
The property of being believed* by a to be a G is ascribed to the holder of F
(if any). In order to construct that property, we must again apply the substitu-
tion technique. The reason is this. The seemingly straightforward construc-
tion of the property — the Closure λwλt λx[0Believe*wt a 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t*
x]]] — is not correct. The variable x occurs within the scope of a Trivial-
ization in the Closure [λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]], because a is related to the con-
struction of a proposition rather than the proposition so constructed. Hence
x occurs 0bound, which amounts to being hyperintensionally mentioned by
the Trivialization, and so x is not amenable to a direct logical operation like
λ-binding. As already mentioned, 0binding, which raises a context to the hy-
perintensional level, is dominant over λ-binding, which creates a lower-level
intensional context. The substitution technique yields the correct construc-
tion of the property:
λwλt [λx[0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]]]
We now need to apply this property to the holder of F . Hence, we extension-
alize the property (by βr-reduction of the above Closure) and Compose the
xxvii See Duží et al. (2010, p. 123), the rule of substitution of v-congruent constructions
(ibid., p. 124) and the extensional rule of substitution (ibid., p. 274).
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result with 0Fwt. The resulting analysis of the passive de re variant becomes
λwλt [λx[0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]] 0Fwt]
Next we generalize the results to intensional attitudes de re. Let Believe/
(oιoτω)τω be a propositional attitude, as above. The critical difference be-
tween intensional and hyperintensional attitudes de re consists in the pres-
ence or absence, respectively, of Double Execution. The analysis of the ac-
tive form “a believes of the F that it is a G” is as above, with one difference.
Let 0Fwt v-construct an individual b. Then the result of the Composition
[0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt]
0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]] is the Closure λw*λt* [0Gw*t*
0b]. But this time a is related to the proposition constructed by this Clo-
sure. Thus we have to execute the Closure to obtain what it constructs. Enter
Double Execution (boldfaced):
λwλt [0Believewt a 2[0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
The passive variant could be analysed in the same way. Yet there is an easier
solution, which does not apply the substitution method. In order to construct
the property of being believed by a to be a G, we use this Closure:
λwλtλx [0Believewt a [λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]
We Compose this property construction (extensionalized with respect to the
attributer’s perspective) with 0Fwt and abstract again over the values of w, t
in order to obtain a proposition. The resulting analysis is this:
λwλt [λx [0Believewt a [λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]] 0Fwt]
When we compile them all, we have a hyperintensional and an intensional
variant of attitudes de dicto, and a hyperintensional and an intensional vari-
ant of attitudes de re in their respective active and passive forms:
(de dicto)
“a believes/believes* that the F is a G”
λwλt [0Believewt a [λw*λt* [0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]]]
λwλt [0Believe*wt a 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* 0Fw*t*]]]
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(de re active)
“a believes/believes* of the F that it is a G”
λwλt [0Believewt a 2[0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
λwλt [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
(de re passive)
“The F is believed/believed* by a to be an F ”
λwλt [λx [0Believewt a [λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]] 0Fwt]
λwλt [λx [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]] 0Fwt]
Let us take stock. Hyperpropositional attitudes de re, as we just described
them, have a string of characteristic features that set them apart from their
de dicto counterparts. First, they are attitudes of somebody or something.
Second, they are parasitic on preceding attitudes, either another attitude de
re or ultimately an attitude de dicto. Third, they occasion an inversion of
perspective, from attributee’s to attributer’s. Fourth, they have an integral
tension built into them: qua hyperintensional they reproduce the attributee’s
perspective; qua de re the individual objects about whom or which the atti-
tudes are entertained are picked out from the attributer’s perspective. Says
Quine,
Spelling dissolves the syntax and lexicon of the content clause and
blends it with that of the ascriber’s language. So long as we rest
with the unanalyzed quotational form, on the other hand, the in-
verted commas mark an opaque interface between two ontologies,
two worlds: that of the man in the attitude, however benighted, and
that of our responsible ascriber of the attitude. (1992, pp. 69–70.)
Transpose Quine’s language-centric approach into our construction-centric
one. Then explicit intensionalization and temporalization is what enables
us to keep separate the two ‘worlds’ or ‘ontologies’ that Quine alludes to;
namely, the perspective of the attributee and that of the attributer. One set
of λ-bound w, t variables represents the attributer’s perspective and another
set the attributee’s. The inversion of perspective explains why the following
argument, sporting an attitude de re in the first premise as well as in the con-
clusion, is valid and its de dicto counterpart is invalid:
(1) The Evening Star is believed by a to be a planet
(2) The Evening Star = the Morning Star
(3) The Morning Star is believed by a to be a planet
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The rationale is that the respective meanings of ‘The Evening Star’ and ‘The
Morning Star’ occur de re: the respective occupants of the offices, which are
individuals, are picked out rather than the respective offices, which are map-
pings. The first premise means that, at the index of evaluation, the occupant
of the office of Evening Star has the property of being believed by a to be
a planet. The second premise means that, at the same index, the two offices
of Evening Star and Morning Star are co-occupied. The conclusion means
that, at the same index, the occupant of the office of Morning Star has the
property of being believed by a to be a planet. (1) and (3) are two differ-
ent truth-conditions (possible-world propositions), for sure, but for any dual
index at which (2) is true, (1) and (3) will share the same truth-value. It is
immaterial to the validity of the argument whether a’s belief be intensional
or hyperintensional.
By contrast, this argument is invalid:
(1′) a believes that the Evening Star is a planet
(2′) The Evening Star = the Morning Star
(3′) a believes that the Morning Star is a planet
The premises are too weak to sustain the conclusion, whether a’s belief be
intensional or hyperintensional. In (1′) the sense of ‘The Morning Star’ oc-
curs de dicto, in (2) de re, and in (3′) de dicto again.xxviii It is irrelevant that
the two offices happen to be co-extensional when what is wanted is that they
should be co-intensional. But, on the other hand, if there were but one office
and not two then the argument would come out trivially valid, because the
conclusion would simply be a rephrasing of the first premise. The invalid-
ity of the existing argument feeds on the classical confusion of function and
functional value (or concept and instance, to use another vernacular).
Hence as soon as (1) is true, the two principles unique to contexts de re kick
in. The validity of substituting terms that co-refer has been illustrated by
the first valid argument. The principle of existential presupposition, that the
xxviii There is a structural analogy with Partee’s puzzle of 90◦F rising: the temperature is
90◦F; the temperature is rising ∴90◦F is rising. What just went wrong? A temperature
is a magnitude (a number-in-intension, like the number of the planets), hence a mapping,
while 90◦F is one of its values (a number). In the first premise ‘the temperature’ occurs
de re because a particular value of the function is identified. In the second premise ‘the
temperature’ occurs de dicto because the mapping is the subject of predication. So where the
conclusion, with its predicate ‘is rising’, demands a reference to a mapping, Partee’s puzzle
has a reference to a functional value. Hence the fallacy. See Duží et al. (2010, pp. 124–125).
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relevant office(s) must be occupied, yields this valid argument when applied
to (1):
(1) The Evening Star is believed by a to be a planet
(4) The Evening Star exists
On the other hand, the following argument is invalid:
(1′) a believes that the Evening Star is a planet
(4′) The Evening Star exists
In the de dicto case a may well believe that the Evening Star is a planet
even if there is no Evening Star, the office going vacant. This is so, be-
cause this office now receives mention within a’s perspective, in the inten-
sional/hyperintensional context of what is believed by a.
4. Rules for Quantifying into Hyperpropositional and Propositional
Contexts de re
The technical challenge of untying an x occurring mentioned in the context
δ[. . . x . . .] and ∃-binding it requires three non-standard devices. The first is
Trivialization. The second is Sub. The third is Tr. We say that Trivializa-
tion is used to mention other constructions (cf. Definition 4 and the subse-
quent Remark). The point of mentioning a construction is to make it, rather
than what it presents, a functional argument. TIL interprets δ as a binary
relation-in-intension between an agent a entertaining an attitude and a con-
struction in its capacity as attitude relatum. Relations, in turn, are construed
as functions, such that δ is typed as a function from worlds to a function
from times to a function from agents and hyperpropositions to truth-values:
given a world/time pair, it is either true or false that a particular agent has a
particular attitude to a particular hyperproposition. In order for the relevant
construction to figure as the second argument of the relevant attitude rela-
tion, it itself needs to be mentioned. If a given (first-order) hyperproposition
is not mentioned but used, the resulting relatum is a possible-world propo-
sition, thus reinstalling the logic of attitudes known from modal logic. A
hyperpropositional attitude context is one in which the second argument of
the attitude relation is a propositional construction.
In Duží and Jespersen (submitted) the rule for quantifying into hyperpropo-
sitional attitudes de dicto is the following. Let the types be: Att* →
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(oι*n)τω: an arbitrary construction of a hyperpropositional attitude relation;
a → ι; C(X)/*n →v oτω: a propositional construction with a constituent
X/*n →v α; c/*(n+1) →v *n; 2c/*(n+2) →v α; ∃*/(o(o*n)). Then the
rule is this:
[Att*wt a
0C(X)]
[0∃*λc [Att*wt a [0Sub c 0X 0C(X)]]]
Proof. The Composition [0Sub c 0X 0C(X)] v(X/c)-constructs the con-
struction C(X). Hence at any 〈w, t〉 at which [Att*wt a 0C(X)] v-constructs
T the class v-constructed by λc [Att*wt a [0Sub c 0X 0C(X)]] is non-empty
and the conclusion [0∃*λc [Att*wt a [0Sub c 0X 0C(X)]]] v-constructs T as
well. 
Remark. Contrast [Att*′
wt
a 0[0Sub c 0X 0C(X)]] with [Att*wt a [0Sub c 0X
0C(X)]]. The latter constructs a truth-value that depends on whether the
agent has the attitude Att* to the result of executing a substitution. The
former also constructs a truth-value, but this time it depends on whether the
agent is related by Att*′ to the very procedure of executing that substitu-
tion, i.e. the agent needs to become a practicing logician. Att*′ would have
to change its type to (oι*n+1)τω , because the result of the Trivialization
0[0Sub c 0X 0C(X)] is the Composition [0Sub c 0X 0C(X)] that belongs at
least to *n+1, i.e. a construction of order n+ 1 that v-constructs a construc-
tion of order n.
Now the final analysis of the valid argument
a believes that the Evening Star is a planet
There is a construction of an individual office such that
a believes that the occupant of that office is a planet
is as follows. Let ES → ιτω be a construction of the office of Evening Star.
Then the resulting analysis is this:
λwλt [0Believe*wt a 0[λwλt [0Planetwt ESwt]]]
λwλt [0∃λc [0Believe*wt a [0Sub c 0ES 0[λwλt [0Planetwt ESwt]]]]]
Quantifying into hyperpropositional attitudes de dicto requires but one rule.
Not so with quantifying into hyperpropositional attitudes de re, which all
come in an active and a passive variant. The twin arguments and their twin
analyses are as follows.
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(active)
a believes* of the F that it is a G
There is an individual of which a believes* that it is a G
λwλt [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Fwt] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]
λwλt [0∃λy [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* it]]]]]
(passive)
The F is believed* by a to be an F
There is an individual that is believed* by a to be a G
λwλt [λx [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]] 0Fwt]
λwλt [0∃λy [0Believe*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0x 0[λw*λt* [0Gw*t* x]]]]]
We are now in a position to formulate the corresponding rules for quanti-
fying into hyperpropositional attitudes de re. Let the types be: Att* →
(oι*n)τω; a → ι; x, y, it/*n →v ι; ∃/(o(oι)); X/ιτω (an individual of-
fice); C(x), C(it) → oτω propositional constructions with at least one free
occurrence of variables x, it, respectively. Then the rules are:
(active hyperintensional variant)
[Att*wt a [
0Sub [0Tr 0Xwt]
0it 0C(it)]]
[0∃λy [Att*wt a [
0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]]]
(passive hyperintensional variant)
[λx [Att*wt a [
0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0C(x)]] 0Xwt]
[0∃λy [Att*wt a [
0Sub [0Tr y] 0x 0C(x)]]]
Proof. By the definition of Composition, if the antecedent v-constructs T,
then it is v-proper, and so is 0Xwt →v ι. Hence there is an individual occu-
pying X at 〈w, t〉. Let this individual be b/ι. Then:
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(active variant)
1. [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Xwt] 0it 0C(it)]] ∅
2. [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] 1, v(b/y)-constructs T
3. λy [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] v-constructs a non-empty class
4. [0∃λy [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] 3, EG
(passive variant)
1. [λx[Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr x] 0x 0C(x)]] 0Xwt] ∅
2. [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr 0Xwt] 0x 0C(x)]] 1, β-reduction
3. [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0x 0C(x)]] 2, v(b/y)-constructs T
4. λy [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0x 0C(x)]] v-constructs a
non-empty class
5. [0∃λy [Att*wt a [0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] 4, EG
Those are the twin rules for quantifying into hyperpropositional contexts de
re. Notice that whereas in the de dicto case quantifying-in is technically
complicated and, without auxiliary assumptions, we are guaranteed to infer
only that there is a construction such that . . . , in the de re case quantifying-
in is straightforward; moreover, we can infer that there is an individual such
that . . .
The corresponding pair of rules for quantifying into propositional contexts
de re can now be easily stated. Let Att → (oιoτω)τω be a construction of a
propositional attitudes de re; the other types as above. Then:
(active intensional variant)
[Attwt a
2[0Sub [0Tr 0Xwt]
0it 0C(it)]]
[0∃λy [Attwt a
2[0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]]]
(passive intensional variant)
[λx [Attwt a C(x)]
0Xwt]
[0∃λy [Attwt a C(y)]]
Proof. By the definitions of Composition and Double Execution, if the an-
tecedent v-constructs T, then it is v-proper, and so is 0Xwt →v ι. Hence
there is an individual occupying X at 〈w, t〉. Let this individual be b/ι. Then:
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(active variant)
1. [Attwt a 2[0Sub [0Tr 0Xwt] 0it 0C(it)]] ∅
2. [Attwt a 2[0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] 1, v(b/y)-constructs T
3. λy [Attwt a 2[0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] v-constructs a non-empty class
4. [0∃λy [Attwt a 2[0Sub [0Tr y] 0it 0C(it)]] 3, EG
(passive variant)
1. [λx [Attwt a C(x)] 0Xwt] ∅
2. [Attwt a C(0Xwt)] 1, β-reduction
3. [Attwt a C(y)] 2, v(b/y)-constructs T
4. λy [Attwt a C(y)] v-constructs a non-empty class
5. [0∃λy [Attwt a C(y)]] 4, EG
(example of active variant)
Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet
There is an individual such that Mary believes that it is a planet
λwλt [0Bwt
0Mary 2[0Sub [0Tr 0Evening Star
wt
] 0it 0[λwλt [0Planetwt it]]]]
λwλt [0∃λx [[0Bwt 0Mary 2[0Sub [0Tr x] 0it 0[λwλt [0Planetwt it]]]]
(example of passive variant)
The Evening Star is believed by Mary to be a planet
There is an individual such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet
λwλt [λy [0Bwt
0Mary λwλt [0Planetwt y]] 0Evening Starwt]
λwλt [0∃λz [[0Bwt 0Mary λwλt [0Planetwt z]]]
Types: B/(oιoτω)τω; Mary/ι; Planet/(oι)τω; Evening Star/ιτω .
This completes our exposition of quantifying into hyperpropositional and
possible-world propositional contexts de re.
Conclusion
Above we presented and proved two rules for quantifying into hyperproposi-
tional attitude contexts de re and two rules for quantifying into propositional
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attitude contexts de re. We also presented the rule for quantifying into hy-
perpropositional contexts de dicto, for comparison. Quantifying into hyper-
intensional contexts requires an extensional logic of hyperintensions in order
to be executed in a principled manner. Quantifying into intensional contexts
requires an extensional logic of intensions in order to be executed in a prin-
cipled manner. Transparent Intensional Logic is one such theory. Much non-
trivial footwork is required to lay out such a large-scale logical semantics.
Once this is done, though, quantifying into hyperintensional and intensional
contexts turns out to be as trivially valid as quantifying into non-attitudinal
(and non-modal), or extensional, contexts. The difference with extensional
contexts is only a matter of logical complexity. In order to relate an agent to a
hyperproposition, the hyperproposition needs to occur mentioned in order to
present itself rather than what it constructs, namely a proposition. The com-
plication is that, since every constituent of a mentioned construction itself
occurs mentioned, the quantifier cannot bind any variable occurring inside
the mentioned context. The solution consists in pre-processing the men-
tioned construction by means of a substitution technique that makes vari-
ables amenable to binding. In this manner quantifying into hyperintensional
contexts is rendered valid while at the same time observing compositionality
and transparency. This marks an advance for philosophical logic in general
and for hyperintensional logic in particular.
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